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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
VIRGIL MOORE, ] 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief, 
Driver License Services, ' 
Department of Public Safety, ! 
State of Utah, 
Defendant-Respondent. ] 
i Case No. 870248-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
211£1&U1Q21QS-&EU-MI2ESLQZ-E&Q£EEI>IBQS 
This appeal is from a driver license revocation after a 
de novo review in the Third District Court of Utah. This Court 
has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under the Implied Consent 
Statute and Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(a). 
^aiEMJSNT.QF_15£yES_PEESJENlED_QH_&EPEAL 
1. Is the statutory requirement to submit a sworn 
report to the Driver's License Division "within 5 days of 
arrest", directory in nature or jurisdictionally mandatory under 
Utah Code Ann. S 41-6-44.10(2)? 
2. Was there prejudicial error by the trial court's 
allowance of respondent to question the petitioner concerning a 
particular incident to a previous DUI arrest? 
3. Does the "Fellow Otficer Rule" allow one otficer to 
swear to another officerfs statement concerning information 
gained in the official course of business? 
4. Was there sufficient evidence which the district 
court could upon a preponderance base its decision? 
Can the statutory provisions contained in Utah Code 
Ann* $ 41-6-44.10(2) in relation to the issues and in light of 
the present § 41-2-129 be interpreted as directory in nature? 
Can Rules 404(b), 405(b), and 803(3) of the Utah Rules 
ot Evidence be found to be applicable to the disputed issues? 
£TATEM£NT_QF_TH£_CASE 
The petitioner was arrested for driving under the 
influence of alcohol in Salt Lake City, Utah on August 5, 1984 
pursuant to U.C.A. § 41-6-44. This case arises from the civil 
proceeding over the revocation of petitioner's driving 
privileges. The petitioner was given a timely administrative 
hearing on the matter from which he appealed to the district 
court for a trial de novo pursuant to U.C.A. S 41-6-44.10. Ai£££ 
£fim£_Jtini£9 the district court revoked the petitioner's license 
after finding upon a preponderance of the evidence that: 
1. The arresting officer had probable cause to and did 
arrest the petitioner for driving under the influence of alcohol. 
2. The petitioner failed to comply with the officer's 
reasonable requests to properly blow into the intoxilyzer machine 
and therefore refused. 
3. The petitioner was properly requested to take a 
chemical test pursuant to U.C.A. 41-6-44.10 (1953) as amended, 
and warned of the consequences of refusal and did refuse. 
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The trial court further concluded that all the 
essential elements of U.C.A. S 41-6-44.10 (1953) as amended, had 
been complied with and revoked petitionees license for one year. 
From this decision arises the appeal in question. 
On August 5, 1984 the petitionee Virgil Moore, was 
arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol. The 
petitioner was given an agency hearing from which he appealed to 
the district court for de novo review. 
The following information was obtained at the district 
court trial through competent sworn testimony. The arresting 
officer, R.K. Sullivan, a policeman for the Salt Lake City Police 
Department first observed the petitioner in his automobile on 950 
South State Street in Salt Lake City. Officer Sullivan testified 
that he personally observed erratic driving patters exhibited by 
the petitioner's vehicle. Specifically, he saw the petitioner's 
car take a "drastic dive towards the curb for no apparent reason" 
(T.T. 4). As Officer Sullivan followed the vehicle he noted that 
"it made slight weaving from side to side inside its lane" (T.T. 
4-5) . Continuing to follow the vehicle, he saw it swerve to miss 
colliding with a flasher barricade that was in plain sight (T.T. 
5). The car next made a right-hand turn onto an other street and 
while doing so, turned so widely that it crossed the center line 
into the opposing traffic's lane (T.T. 5). As Officer Sullivan 
continued to follow the petitioner he clocked him going 48 miles 
per hour in a 35 mph zone. And subsequently pulled him over 
(T.T. 5). 
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Officer Sullivan testified that as he approached the 
stopped vehicle he observed Mr. Moore to be the only occupant of 
that vehicle and identified him as such in court (T.T. 6). At 
this time in the incident, Officer Sullivan noted that the 
petitioner had poor balance, slurred speech, a prominent odor of 
alcoholic beverage around him and did not even know where he was 
at the time (T.T. 6, 7, 15). Subsequently, the petitioner was 
asked to perform some field sobriety tests including a modified 
standing test, one-leg count test, walk and turn test, hand slap 
test, and a gaze nystagmus test. Officer Sullivan testified that 
the petitioner had difficulty understanding instructions 
concerning the tests and was unable to perform any of them 
satisfactory. He swayed forward and back, put his foot down at 
the count of 3, walked heel to toe 6 to 10 inches apart and 
stumbled and staggered (T.T. 7-9). 
With the foregoing information, Officer Sullivan placed 
the petitioner under arrest for drunk driving, requested that he 
submit to an intoxilyzer test, and read him the admonitions 
concerning it (T.T. 9)• The petitioner responded that he would 
take the test. 
At this point, Officer Cracroft, in a back-up unit, had 
arrived to assist Officer Sullivan with the arrest (T.T. 9). 
Since Officer Sullivan was on a motorcycle that evening he 
requested Officer Cracroft to transport the petitioner and 
administer the breath test to him (T.T. 5, 9-10). 
Officer Sullivan next saw the petitioner at the police 
station where the breath test was to be administered. At that 
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point/ he was told by Officer Cracroft that the petitioner 
refused to submit to a blood alcohol test (T.T* 18-19). Upon 
this. Officer Sullivan filled out his DUI report, properly swore 
to its truthfulness before a notary, and submitted it to the 
Driver's License Division (T.T. 10)• 
Officer David Cracroft, the officer who transported and 
attempted to administer the breathilyzer test to the petitioner, 
testified concerning the petitioner's refusal to submit to that 
test. Officer Cracroft testified that he was certified to 
administer the breath test and did in fact Attempt to do so (T.T. 
21-22) . Officer Cracroft went through the standard operating 
procedure for the intoxilyzer machine, and used the operational 
checklist (T.T. 22, 31). He also testified that he observed no 
problems with the machine (T.T. 33). Officer Cracroft stated 
that when he asked the petitioner to blow into the machine as 
instructed, the petitioner would appear to blow but little if any 
air would pass into the machine (T.T. 22). This happened several 
times. Officer Cracroft then being of the opinion that the 
petitioner was purposely withholding his breath, gave him the 
implied consent warning (T.T. 23). Officer Cracroft gave the 
petitioner another chance and got the same type of response. 
Consequently, the petitioner's insubordinate actions deemed a 
refusal (T.T. 23-24). In Officer Cracroft's opinion, there were 
never any operational problems with the intoxilyzer machine other 
than it never received a sufficient air sample from the 
petitioner (T.T. 129). 
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After deeming the petitioner's response a refusal, 
Otficer Cracroft personally told Officer Sullivan the 
circumstances surrounding the petitioner's refusal to take the 
test (T.T. 24). Officer Sullivan, additionally, testified that 
Officer Cracroft was his fellow officer that evening (T.T. 19). 
The petitioner never offered any evidence that would 
have refuted any substantial element offered by the respondent 
other than declaring that he was, indeed, trying to blow into the 
intoxilyzer machine. 
£II£UlAfiX.fi£.ZH£.AfiSIZMElIZ 
The court record supplied substantial credible evidence 
showing that Otficer Sullivan actually submitted his sworn DUI 
Report to the Driver's License Division in the requisite amount 
of time. Furthermore, the statutory requirement of submitting 
said report to the Driver's License Division "within 5 days" of 
arrest stated in U.C.A. § 41-6-44.10(2) must be directory in 
nature and not mandatory. This conclusion is reached by viewing 
the submission requirement in light of the legislative intent 
behind the DUI statutes in general. 
The trial court did not commit reversible error in 
allowing the respondent to ask questions of the petitioner 
concerning particular incidents surrounding a previous DUI 
arrest. The sought after information is admissible under Rule 
803(3) of the Utah Rules of evidence since it showed the 
declarants then existing state of mind. The information is also 
admissible under Rules 404(b) and 405(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Finally, admissibility is proper since the testimony's 
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prejudicial effect does nfli substantially outweigh its probative 
value* 
An arresting officer's sworn DUI report is valid and 
complete despite the fact that some of the information contained 
in it was provided by an other officer's personal knowledge. The 
"Fellow Oificer's Rule" allows the arresting otficer to swear to 
the truthfulness of facts provided him by a fellow officer. 
Substantial and credible evidence sustains the district 
court's finding that upon a preponderance of the evidence the 
petitioner was found to have been driving while intoxicated and 
to have refused an intoxilyzer test. 
PfllMLl 
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. S 41-6-44.10(2) 
THE 5-DAY SUBMISSION REQUIREMENT OF 
A SWORN DUI REPORT IS DIRECTORY AND 
NOT JURISDICTIONALLY MANDATORY. 
Substantial and creditable evidence was presented at 
the District Court De Novo trial that Officer Sullivan submitted 
a sworn DUI report to the Driver's License Division within 5 days 
of the petitioner's arrest. The DUI Report Form shows arrest on 
8-5-84 and receipt 2 days later. 
U.C.A. 41-6-44.10-2(a)(iii) (as amended 1987) says that 
on "behalf of the division" the arresting police officer in a DUI 
case is to sukJBJLfc a signed report to the Department on a "form 
approved by the division" which serves as a temporary 30-day 
license. The reason for a signed report is obviously to give the 
Department notice to record the temporary license and that a 
hearing may be required to be set if requested. It also notifies 
the Department of the grounds for the arrest and revocation and 
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information on which officers are to be subpoenaed for a 
requested hearing. 
The statute indicates that the report which sets forth 
the information required in U.C.A. S 41-6-44.10(2)(iii) is mainly 
to "supply to the operator, basic information regarding how to 
obtain a hearing." 
The relevant question of inquiry can be divided into 
two parts. One, was the DUI report submitted within 5 days of 
the questioned arrest; and two, did the report contain sufficient 
information to notify the Department and the driver as outlined 
in U.C.A. S 41-6-44.10(2)? 
This record contains "substantial evidence" that 
Officer Sullivan submitted his DUI report to the Division QQ 
iime* When asked if he had submitted the report to the Driver's 
License Division, Officer Sullivan testified in the affirmative 
(T.T. 10). No evidence was ever introduced at trial to rebut the 
officer's statements on this matter, therefore the trial court's 
finding that the DUI report was submitted to the Driver's License 
Division can only be sustained. 
The evidence shows that the report satisfied the 
statute and common sense. In the first 10 pages of the trial 
transcript counsel for the respondent elicited from Officer 
Sullivan the information that established probable cause to 
arrest the petitioner for driving under the influence, actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle by the petitioner, and the 
facts surrounding petitioner's refusal to submit to a blood 
alcohol test. When the officer was asked whether he filled out a 
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report representing those facts, he responded, "Yes, I did do 
that* (T.T. 10). Otficer Sullivan identified the DUI report 
(Addendum I) that he submitted to the Driver's License Division 
and atfirmatively testified that he swore to it the night of the 
arrest before a notary (T.T. 10). 
Reading the whole Implied Consent statute and its 
stated public safety purpose (U.C.A. S 41-2-129), it should be 
clear that the 5 day submission requirement of a DUI report form 
in U.C.A. S 41-6-44.10(2) is directory and procedural in nature 
to the Division and not jurisdictionally mandatory. 
The purposes of the DUI statutes in this state are 
expressed in U.C.A. S 41-2-19.5. and U.C.A. § 41-2-129 (amended 
January 1987). The statute clearly states that the purpose of 
Section 41-6-44.10 is for: 
protecting persons on roads and highways by 
quickly removing from the highways those 
persons who have shown they are safety hazards 
by driving with a blood alcohol content above 
a certain level or while under the influence 
of alcohol and any drug or by refw?ipg_;fcg_;fcaKs 
A-Cl)£IDi£fll«i££i«i]3at_£fiiDElies_iiiti3_tlie 
££9Ui££m£a££_££_£££Hfia-41r£zi4^1£* (Emphasis 
added) • 
When the State of Utah enacts legislation such as its 
DUI statutes it has two competing interests that must be balanced 
and weighed and given consideration. First, the state has a 
legitimate and compelling constitutional interest and duty in the 
protection of its innocent drivers as expressed in its purposeful 
statement. Against this interest must be weighed against the 
privileges of the drivers who break the law. £££ M^ ffKey Y* 
M£Ht£¥IDf 443 U.S. 1 99 S.Ct. 2612 (1979) for an example as well 
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as Maih£KS_JLL_EJLdlida£r 4 2 4 u«s* 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 
L.Ed2d 18 (1976) • To determine the legislative intent concerning 
the mandatory or directory nature ot the 5-day submission 
requirement for DUI reports, it might be analyzed as to whom the 
requirement was designed to protect, the state and its interests 
or the driver. If it is interpreted as directory, both interests 
are equally served. Five days directed and 30 days mandated to 
benefit the driver. 
The states interest in quickly removing dangerous 
drivers from its roads and highways is compelling, but the 
Department of Public Safety must receive the notice or the 
license will not be suspended on the 30th day as required. 
It could be argued that a mandatory purpose of the 30-
day hearing time requirement also insures the quick resolution 
for the driver's benefit. During the 5 day or 30 day period the 
driver is in possession of a temporary driving license. His 
right to drive remains unaffected. This state's temporary 
driving license is valid until its is revoked by an agency 
hearing or for 30 days. Should the 30-day license expire prior 
to any requested administrative or judicial proceeding reviewing 
the merits of the revocation, the accused would surely have 
grounds for a temporary license extension or possibly a dismissal 
of the pending action. The 1988 Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act and S 41-6-44.10(2)(b) both provide for a reversal, and (c) 
for a court review. MaGk£y_Ya_MQn£ryjDf !£• simply requires some 
form of procedural due process and opportunity to be heard 
subsequent to revoking a driver's license. There is in this 
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case, however, absolutely no evidence supporting or indicating 
that the petitioner's temporary license expired prior to the 
administrative hearing, therefore he received a prompt resolution 
pilflX_£fi any final action even if the official report had been 
submitted late.* 
The above analysis makes sense* If a directory report 
is received after 5 days, then a requested hearing can still be 
held and reviewed. If the hearing shows that the driver is not 
dangerous, then both the state's and driver's interests are 
served. If mandated, then any harmless procedural error would 
leave a licensed dangerous driver on the highways. To hold that 
the 5 day requirement is jurisdictionally mandatory would ignore 
the fact that the driver is already protected by a temporary 
driver's license. It would also rob the district and appellant 
courts of jurisdiction. 
Other civil proceedings that adjudicate individual 
privileges are not required to be docketed and disposed of in a 
short 25-day time period. Why would the legislature single out 
driver's license revocations to deserve special treatment in this 
manner? 
The cited cases fl£l£ien~XjL-Z>S.hven&lBMl# 668 P.2d 50 9 
(Utah 1983), £la£k]2yiD_^^Si£I_Y£l)i£l^^ 
JianfiCfiXJtjaiifil)t 567 P.2d 1267 (Ct. App. Ore. 1978) ,and Colmap y. 
ScJltffiLUdilDail9 680 P.2d 29 (Utah 1984) are not on point and the 
statute has since been amended. These cases solely address 
themselves to the necessity of a DUI report being sworn to, as 
was required, but specifically do not address the mandatory 
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j u r i s d i c t i o n a l arguments. H£l£Jt£D_YjL_££l)K£DdilDail, 668 P.2d 509, 
512 (Utah 1983) , not fol lowing filackkUXD. jSfifi 3 l££ Jus t i ce Oaks 
and Hall d i s s e n t i n g . Since the o f f i c er must appear and give a 
residuum of l e g a l l y competent test imony, the report i s s o l e l y 
necessary to the Department. &£hl-X±-£>QhU£nsliman* 735 P.2d 413 
(Ut. App. 1987) . 
THE PETITIONER'S PRIOR ARREST EXPERIENCE 
SHOWED HIS STATE OF MIND AND WAS 
RELEVANT, ADMISSIBLE AND NOT UNDULY 
PREJUDICIAL. 
The line of questioning that the petitioner opposes 
concerns information gained as a result of the respondent 
questioning him about a specific DUI arrest prior to the one in 
question (T.T. 48-51). The questions required simple "yes or 
"no" responses and were obviously designed to show that the 
petitioner had previous experience with an intoxilyzer machine. 
Specifically, questions of whether the officer in that previous 
case maintained that Mr. Moore had failed to blow properly into 
the intoxilyzer machine where relevant and not hearsay. Upon 
petitioner's objection to this question, the trial court felt 
that the question went to showing the state of mind of the 
declarant and admissible (T.T. 52). The respondent urges this 
Court to give great deference to the trial court's discretion and 
maintains that the question and response fall under hearsay 
exceptions Rule 803(3) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The question concerning the police otticer's contention 
in this driver's previous case was material and relevant under 
Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 404(b) of the same 
rule states: 
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Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts 
is not admissible to prove the character of 
a person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
djaDx-JSD£tfl£da£' identity, £i_.ak££n££_££ 
flLJStakfi-fil-flggifleDt* (Emphasis added) • 
This section is relevant to the question in that it allows 
evidence of past conduct to show that the petitioner's contented 
physical inability to blow was very possibly part of a 
preconceived plan and not a mistake or accident. 
Furthermore, the narrow question was directed to a 
specific instance and therefore Rule 405(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence may also be applicable. 
In cases in which character or a trait 
of a person is an essential element ot a 
charge, claim, or defense, pippfmay^alsg 
t2£.ID2d£.£i.£P££iii£^L£l£D£££^iMlU£-£filldU£Jt« (Emphasis added). 
The petitionees unwillingness to correctly blow in the 
intoxilyzer machine in his previous arrest provides information 
showing a general unwillingness to follow intoxilyzer 
instructions and a desire to circumvent the purpose of the 
statute. In this particular case the Court could find that the 
petitioner intentionally failed to blow into the intoxilyzer 
machine after receiving proper instructions. 
Ruling on the admissibility of evidence showing 
previous criminal behavior, the Utah Supreme Court in St3te ¥• 
Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Utah 1982) stated "The testimony is 
admissible if, and only if, it is relevant to prove some fact 
that is material to the crime charged." The petitioner in this 
case says he did not refuse the breath test under the implied 
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consent statute, Surelyf the previous actions are relevant to 
the petitioner's state of mind in this civil case when he refused 
by failing to give an adequate air sample. 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence excludes the 
admission of relevant evidence "when its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice," The 
use of descriptive words such as "substantially" and "unfair" 
appear to indicate an extreme or out of the ordinary type of 
prejudice. The probative value of the evidence in question is 
high and it's "unfair prejudicial" affect is relatively low. The 
fact that there was already substantial evidence submitted by 
Officer Cracroft which showed the petitioner's conduct amounted 
to a refusal also minimizes any possible prejudicial effect of 
the corroborative information gained. Also, the strict 
application of the Rules of Evidence are primarily although not 
exclusively focused on protecting the accused from laymen juries 
who are not legally trained. This case was before a competent 
trial judge trained in evidence who's discretion should be upheld 
by this Court. 
A POLICE OFFICER MAY TESTIFY TO A 
FELLOW OFFICER'S STATEMENTS MADE 
IN THE OFFICIAL COURSE OF BUSINESS. 
At trial the petitioner contended that Officer Sullivan 
relied upon the hearsay statements of a fellow otticer when he 
swore to the truthfulness of his DUI report. Officer Sullivan 
was not present when the petitioner allegedly refused to submit 
to the intoxilyzer test. Officer Sullivan relied upon his fellow 
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officerfs word, Officer Cracroft, that there was a refusal and 
then entered that information into his sworn report (T.T. 10, 18, 
19). The statute provides for help by fellow officers and no 
longer requires the same arresting officer to do everything in 
one case* Teamwork is necessary. 
For example, the Utah State Supreme Court in Slfltfi-ijL 
Ei£LS£JQr 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986) seemed to say hearsay is O.K. 
if it is reliable, fljelsen addresses the issue of whether the 
affidavit of a police officer supporting probable cause for a 
search warrant can contain hearsay of a fellow otficer and still 
be valid. In the civil case at bar, the issue concerns the 
validity of a sworn DUI report in that it contains hearsay from a 
fellow officer as well. The two cases seem to be analogous 
except 23i£l££H was a criminal case that should have even stricter 
hearsay standards but did not. 
Concerning the matter of fellow officer hearsay in a 
sworn statement, the Utah Court in Nielsen* fijigia. at p. 192 
stated the following. 
The use of hearsay e v i d e n c e t o e s t a b l i s h 
probable cause does not n e c e s s a r i l y undercut 
the v a l i d i t y of a warrant . If the hearsay 
i s r e l i a b l e , and t h e r e i s a s u b s t a n t i a l 
b a s i s for g i v i n g i t c r e d e n c e , i t w i l l support 
the i s s u a n c e of a warrant . United _Stfl£fi5_:y,i 
EaLliS, 403 U.S . 5 7 3 , 5 8 0 - 8 1 , 91 S .Ct . 2075 
2080 , 29 L.Ed.2d 723 ( 1 9 7 1 ) ; ZQSLS}L& £fcai£ 
X±-Bailkh£a&# 30 Utah 2d 1 3 5 , 1 3 8 , 514 P.2d 
800 , 802 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ; Sifli£_,XjL-ll£flflMY, 28 Utah 
2d 1 6 0 , 1 6 2 - 6 3 , 499 P.2d 846 , 847-48 ( 1 9 7 2 ) . 
In a d d i t i o n , t h e r e i s a presumption t h a t law 
enforcement o f f i c e r s w i l l convey in format ion 
t o each o ther t r u t h f u l l y . £ £ £ , ^ g A , Uuitfid 
£Jtfli££_Y*_Y£Ii:tI£S£fl i 380 U.S . 1 0 2 , 1 1 1 , 85 
S . C t . 7 4 1 , 7 4 7 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 ( 1 9 6 5 ) ; 
McCfiIIDi£j5-XA-UDiJtefl-J5iflJt£fir 309 F.2d 367 , 
372 (7th C i r . 1 9 6 2 ) , £ £ i i . d£nif id, 372 
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U.S . 9 1 1 , 83 S .Ct . 7 2 4 , 9 L.Ed.2d 719 ( 1 9 6 3 ) ; 
£££Pl£_2.i._L£fll)y# 173 C o l o . 3 3 9 , 484 P.2d 
7 7 8 , 781 ( 1 9 7 0 ) ; fi££ a&n&L^lll 1 W. Lafave , 
SfiarciJ^flDd-Sfiizuifi S 3 . 5 ( a ) a t 619-21 ( 1 9 7 8 ) . 
T h e r e f o r e , double hearsay between p o l i c e 
o f f i c e r s i s not f a t a l on i t s f a c e t o the 
v a l i d i t y of a warrant . 
The reliability of Officer Cracroft's statements 
concerning the petitioner's refusal to Otticer Sullivan are in no 
way reasonably questionable, nor were they shown to be 
unreliable. The statements were made contemporaneously with the 
occurrence and they were personal observations made directly to 
Otficer Sullivan. There is no indication in the record or 
elsewhere establishing a reason for why Officer Cracroft might 
lie. This compounded with the presumption that fellow officers 
will convey information to each other truthfully certainly 
provides the requisite reliability necessary to uphold the 
validity of the sworn DUI report. The trial court listened and 
observed as the fact finder and also believed the fellow 
officer*s statements to be truthful and trustworthy under the 
circumstances. That Court's findings should therefore not be 
cast aside. 
SUBSTANTIAL AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE WAS 
PRESENTED AT TRIAL UPON WHICH THE TRIAL 
COURT COULD BASE THE DECISION UPHOLDING 
THE DEPARTMENT'S ACTIONS. 
Substantial and credible evidence was presented at 
trial meeting all the requisite elements under Utah Code Ann. S 
41-6-44.10 statutorily necessary to revoke the petitioner's 
driving privileges for one year. 
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1. As the facts have more than adequately indicated, 
Otficer Sullivan had grounds to believe that the petitioner was 
under the influence of alcohol. The petitionees erratic driving 
pattern and inability to successfully perform the field sobriety 
tests provided an ample basis for grounds for arrest. 
2. The evidence also showed uncontrovertibly, that the 
petitioner was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while under the influence. 
3. The petitioner was given the implied consent 
admonitions and warnings regarding the consequences of refusing a 
blood alcohol test on two different occasions, and the evidence 
showed that he understood them. 
4. Finally, Officer Cracroft provided credible 
testimony regarding the petitioner's refusal to properly blow 
into the intoxilyzer machine. There was never any evidence 
indicating that the petitioner did not objectively understand 
Officer Cracroft's instructions or was physically unable to 
properly blow into the machine. 
Driver's license revocation proceedings such as this 
are civil and the standard of proof is upon a preponderance of 
the evidence. U^llaL^^^S^te^Q^Q^^hlQl&JlL^i&lQIi, 5 95 P.2d 
1302 (Utah 1979). In the case of QaLQ±a_j£JL^£QhH£Il&iman9 645 P.2d 
651f 653 (Utah 1982) the Utah Supreme Court outlined the standard 
of appellate review in driver's license revocation cases. "The 
standard for appellate review of factual findings affords gteat 
AfilfilfinCfi to the trial courtfs view of the evidence unless the 
trial court has misapplied the law or its findings are cleatly 
flSaiD£i_i;b£_:K£igili_J2£-fiXldfiflCfi •" (Emph a s i s ad d ed) . 
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Since the record contains the evidence of substance to 
sustain the trial court's findings, those findings should not be 
disturbed. 
QQUQLU21Q8 
Based upon the substantial uncontradicted evidence 
produced at trial and the absence of any prejudicial error, the 
trial court's and Division's decisions must be affirmed* 
DATED this Jj^z. day of October, 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attj>«Tey3Eeneral 
~^^C^_ 
UJCE M. HALE 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Randall Gaither, 321 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102, this _Zl2irday of October, 1987. 
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ADDENDUM I 
11 0 f ? / ^ A B B 
I. CASE IDENTIFICATION 
Date 
Subjec' 
Place of Employment 
DUI REPORT FORM 
Accident,l__z_z~ Case # /yim*\}*)d^*j Time Prepared 
ft JLft\&ft Addrest^^j5^-35Ci0^pyn^Fu 
Address 
river License # 
Home Te|£ohone Number 
DOB. ^ ^ ! ^ S ^ 3 
Place of Arrest « * = ^ V - » -^- - - ^ .^ 
Arresting Off » c e r _ 3 U \ U V C \ A ^ 7 8 
Arresting Agency ^ ^ O J p j ^ 
Work Telephone Number 
^ ( 0 ^ ) Time of Arrest 
.Charges j O ^ S ^ i 
Assisting Officers Sdpss* 
Year_ 
License* and state 
Registered Owner 
Make TOl f l f i^ t , . K 
| j f o i V \ Disposition Q V T M 
fiffifftV Li Address 
III. WITNESSES: (If passengers, indicate specifically) 
Name Address Tele. # 
mX5o\ ^y^j 
Age/DOB 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
IV. ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL: 
The facts establishing the subject's actual physical control of a motor vehicle are: ) V A J Q n > w r 
" 9 3 3 So, State 5-V.
 Tlmt.fflOO V. DRIVING PATTERN: Subject's location when first observed
 y ^ ^ ^ _ _ 
The facts observed regarding driyjng paUarn; fVQ'QfflS.'T^H 5 V > f t ? P ^ ^ . 
_ . - a — ^ ^ O * -
, &ff^Mej\ICyv\*r. 
VI. PRE-ARREST STATEMENTS OF SUBJECT: » - ™ ^
 % ' ^' " " ^. . . r 
W<4- Wv\/rw— U.VDIH TL_»ev\ ft-V* * 
sv 
~two- °{ L y W ^S-w fr*r 
VII. PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Odor of alcoholic bevera uaor of aiconoiic beverage _^  ^ ^ i . _ ,.— , . . fT * - 4^L. 
Speech y O ^ M J 5 & R « * A , , J & t a ? ^ Q V 3 * 5 V j * p t ^ ^ J M 0 ^ 
Balance I ^ ^ & f t X k ^ T ^ ^ t C t t ^ > V ^ 4 t f O , V < O f t ^ T ^ S * & W 
Signs or complaints of injury or i^ness > ffi^Ayilfc o X ^ M ^ ^ y j j>
 f f l * t j g . rftA^A 
ler physicaj characteri " "~~* 
ll
ristics^^vnT3iiitAtt£^-^vdj6ft^jfti 
- Pft, TOP.— ftp**^* 
r*rrrsr-t% 
.Were tests demonstrated by officer? yes . Subject's ability 
IX. SEARCHES 
A. Vehicle: 
Was subject's vehicle searched? l /£?S Where? < = ^ l ^ OD» I ' ^ I O A V ^ 
Person who performed the search - ,^5u \ u s / ^ A ^ V 
Was subject's person seached? _. Where? 
When? u 3 3 ^ EvidencJ Found NjQY)(r~ 
Person who performed the search (^FyJ 
X. CHEMICAL JEST^rf>£>£ 
(jMin)or Mrs. V \ \ ( J ^ f y C , do you understand that you are under arrest for 
driving under the influence of alchohol (drugs)? Response, (if any) \ J r ^ ^ 
I hereby request that you submit to a-Qhemical test to determine the alcohol (drug) content of your I hereby request that you sub it to a- he ical test to deter i 
blood. I request that you take a v X f f i ^ f V V V > test. 
(blood-breath-urine) 
The following admonition was given by me to the subject before the chemical test was 
administered: 
Results indicating .08% or more by weight of alcohol in your blood shall, and the 
existence of a blood alcohol content or presence of drugs sufficient to render you 
incapable of safely driving a vehicle can, result in suspension or revocation of your 
license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle. 
What is your response to my request that you submit to a chemical test? Respo nse: M v ^ S 
Did subject submit to a chemical test? / \ J U Type of test _ 
Test Administered by Where? 
When? Results Was subject notified of results? 
(If the subject refuses the test, read the following) 
D The following admonition was given by me to the subject: 
If you refuse the test, it will not be given, however I must warn you that if you refuse, 
your license or permit to drive a motor vehicle can be revoked for one year with no 
provision for a limited driver's license. After you have taken this test, you will be 
Dermitted to have a physician of your own choice administer a test at your own expense, 
--- , _.. ^ „
 l K m i , t o <.n j o n Q a s j | d o e s n o delay the 
n The following admonition was given by me to the subjectl 
Your right to remain silent and your right to counsel do not apply to the implied consent 
law which is civil in nature and separate from the criminal charges. Your right to remain 
silent does not give you the right to refuse to take the test. You do not have the right to 
have counsel during the test procedure. Unless you submit to the test I am requesting, I 
will consider that you have refused to take the test. I warn you that if you refuse to take 
the test, your driver's license can be revoked for one year with no provision for a limited 
license. 
XI. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Was sybject advi 
B 
•
 R,GHTS:
 v j/^c. r r 1 ^ ^ 
issd oMh£ following rights? 7 vl_^> When? \J. 1 X J 
S ^ A W V / O m c J L — W h e r e ? ; ^ M C f t $& 
y*r7 O ^ V W Q A V W h e r e ? ^ M C f o ^ W j j J ^ 
yn. You have the right to remain silent. < ^ - ^ 
\/_^"''Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. 
J Z 3 . You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are being 
questioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you 
before any questioning, if you wish one. 
If you decide to answer questions now without having counsel present, you may stop 
answering questions at any time. Also, you may request counsel at any time during 
questioning. 
Were tb^lfollowing waiver questions asked? 
1. Do you und^rsfcAdffiqh of these rights I have explained to you? 
Response 
y 2. Having these j i g fits in rnind, do you wish to talk to us now? 
Response 
s_ 
INTERVIEWr 
Were yqu^operating a vehicle? 
Where were you going?. vvuere were yuu gumyr V g ^ V V \ C~7K^\ v ~ < ^ ^ - t H *T> C^ ^ ^ 9 ? 
What street or highway were you Q n ? A \ y — £ \ V ^ " ^ ^ p P Q ^ ^ ^ \ ^ ^ 
EftwvKSoA Direction of travel?. Where did you start from? 
When? What time is it now? 
What is today's date? Date of week? 
(Actual time Date Day 
What city or county are you in now? 
What were you doing during the last three hours? 
Have you been drinking? 
What? How much?. 
Where? 
When did you have your first drink? Last drink?. 
Are you under the influence of an alcoholic beverage (drugs) now? 
Are you taking tranquilizers, pills, medicines or drugs of any kind? y f ^ " ^ 
(What kind? get sample) 
When did you have the last doste? T - ^ ^ t v ^ * C ^ j Q 
Are you ill? ^ t > * 
(If subject was in an accident, ask these questions:) RPCFfVPnpy 
Were you involved in an accident today? DRIVER LICENTX AUG 0 7 19£M 
Have you had any alcoholic beverage or drugs since the accident? 
If so, what? When? 
OTI-v. 
§2 T^r 
ATTACHED DOCUMENTS 
l^ave attached the following documents to this report: 
I^Tcopy of citation/temporary license 
2!S^Subject's Utah driver's license or driver's permit. 
3. Z Traffic accident report. 
4. Z Other documents (specify) 
Date Report 
RIZEDENDORSIN6 SIGNATURE: 
was completed. 
'HO IZED 
>bty and swear that I am a sworn Ut^r peace officer and that I have prepared the^bove report form and that 
1nforfrraUon:Qn_lhe report fom^amfthe attached do£umef*4e-are true and correc/tp my knowledge and belief 
I that the rep?7T+4aiiii_waj^ ^ regulapetfUrse of my duhes. It is my bel^^fTe^Ubi§c^was in violation 
section 41-6-44 U.C^ATanhe date, time and pl£ce specifiedJn^fTi^ report. 
ATE OF U W U / - — - / ^ \ SS. 
nrorcement Agency: 
Signature of Peace 
Law E f  
Date 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 
NOTARY PUtfUC / ) yf 
Residing at: ^ T Z ? ( ^ ^ ^ ^ T ^ J d fC^J 
y Commission/Expires: 
The^orfalna! of this form must be sent within five (5) days of the arrest of the subject to: 
Officer of Driver License Services 
4501 South 2700 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
ADDENDUM I I 
OPERATORS* LICENSE ACT 41-2-129 
(b) Upon the conclusion of the examination the division may suspend 
or revoke the person's license, permit him to retain the license, or issue a 
license subject to restriction by § 41-2-113. 
(c) Refusal or neglect of the licensee to submit to an examination is 
grounds for suspension or revocation of his license. 
( I D A report authorized by § 41-2-119 may not contain any evidence of a 
conviction for speeding on an interstate system in this state if the conviction 
was for a speed of less than 71 miles per hour and did not result in an acci-
dent, unless authorized in writing by the individual whose report is being 
requested 
(12) (a) By following the emergency procedures set forth in Chapter 46b, 
Title 63, the division may immediately suspend the license of a person if 
it has reason to believe that the person is the owner of a motor vehicle for 
which a security is required under Chapter 12a, Title 41, Financial Re-
sponsibility of Motor Vehicle Owners and Operators Act, and has oper-
ated the vehicle or permitted it to be operated within this state without 
the aecurity being in effect. 
(b) Sections 41-12a-411 and 41-12a-412 regarding the surrender of li-
cense plates and registration of motor vehicles and the requirement of 
proof of financial responsibility apply to persons whose driving privileges 
are suspended under this subsection. 
(c) If the division exercises the right of immediate suspension granted 
under this subsection, the notice and hearing provisions of Subsection (5) 
apply. 
(d) A person whose license suspension has been sustained or whose 
license has been revoked by the division under this subsection may file a 
request for agency action requesting a hearing. 
History: C. 1953, 41-2-19, enacted by L. wrote and reorganized the aection, as last 
197S (2nd S.S.), ch. 9, I 2; L 19S3, ch. 99, amended by Laws 19S6, ch 204, I 2S0. to the 
I 3; 19&3, ch. 1S3, I 22, 1983, ch. 187, I 3; extent that a detailed analysis u lmpracUca-
19&3. ch. 192.1 1; 1984. ch. 39,1 1; 1985. ch. ble 
153. I 2; 1985, ch. 242, I 47; 1986, ch. 204, The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 161. effec-
i 280; renumbered by L. 1987, ch- 136. I 5; tive January 1.1988, rewrote the section to the 
1987, ch. 137, I 28. 1987, ch. 161, I 137. extent that a detailed analysis u impracuca-
Amended effective January 1, 1988. — ble 
Laws 1987. Ch 161.1 137 amends this aection This section is set out as reconciled by the 
effective January 1. 1988 See catch line "Com* Office of Legislative Research and General 
pliers Notes" below. Counsel 
Compiler's Notes.— The 1987 amendment, A.L.R. — Automobiles validity and con-
by Chapter 136, so rewrote this section as to strucuon of legislation authorizing revocation 
make a detailed analysis impracticable or suspension of operator's license for "habit-
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 137, re- ual," "persistent," or "frequent" violations of 
numbered this section which formerly ap- traffic reflations, 48 A L R 4th 367 
peared as I 41*2-19. substituted "division** for Croas-References. — Sentencing for nusde-
"department" throughout the section, and re- meanors, H 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301 
41*2-129. Purpose of revocation or suspension for driving 
under the influence. 
The Legislature finds that a primary purpose of the provisions in this title 
that relate to suspension or revocation of a person's license or privilege to 
operate a motor vehicle for driving with a blood alcohol content above a cer-
tain level or while under the influence of alcohol or any drug, or a combina-
137 
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tion of alcohol and any drug, or for refusing to take a chemical test as provided 
in § 41-6-44.10, is protecting persons on highways by quickly removing from 
the highways those persons who have shown they are safety hazards by driv-
ing with a blood or breath alcohol content above a certain level or while under 
the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug or 
by refusing to take a chemical test that complies with the requirements of 
§ 41-6-44 10. 
Hiftory: C. 19&3, 41*2-19.5, enacted by L. tUnc* of "alcohol content above a certain 
19&3. ch. 99. I 5; renumbered by L» 1987, leveP. and made minor changee in phraaeoiogy 
cb. 137, i 29. ^ d
 i t y | t . 
Compller'a Notes,--The 1987 amendment
 CiUfd | n ^ v Schwendanan, 720 P.2d 
renumbered thia aection which formerly ap- 77fl ,\u-u io&£\ 
peiml u I 41-2-19 5. •utatitutcd "Utle" for 7 7 8 ( U U h 1 9 8 6 ) ' 
"code", added "or breath** before the aeoond in-
41-2-130. Chemical test — Grounds and procedure for offi-
cer's request — Taking license — Issuing tempo-
rary licenses — Information to obtain hearing — 
Report to department — Department procedure 
— Suspension — Additional fee. 
(1) (a) When a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person 
may be violating or has violated § 41-6-44 the peace officer may, in con-
nection with his arrest of the person, request the person to submit to 
chemical tests to be administered in compliance with the standards under 
5 41-6-44.10. 
(b) In this section, § 41-6-44 includes a local ordinance similar to this 
section adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1). 
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the person's submission 
to a chemical test that results indicating a violation of 5 41-6-44 shall, and 
the existence of a blood alcohol content sufficient to render the person incapa-
ble of safely driving a vehicle may, result in suspension or revocation of the 
person's license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle. 
(3) If the person submits to that chemical test and the results indicate a 
blood or breath alcohol content in violation of § 41-6-44, or if the officer 
makes a determination, based on reasonable grounds, that the person is other-
wise in violation of § 41-6-44, the officer directing administration of the test 
or making the determination shall serve on the person, on behalf of the divi-
sion, immediate notice of the division's intention to suspend the person's privi-
lege or license to operate a vehicle. If the officer serves that immediate notice 
on behalf of the division he shall: (a) take the Utah license certificate or 
permit, if any, of the operator; (b) issue a temporary license effective for only 
30 days; and (c) supply to the operator, on a form to be approved by the 
division, basic information regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing before 
the division. A citation issued by the officer may, if approved as to form by the 
division, serve also as the temporary license. 
(4) The peace officer serving the notice shall send to the division within five 
days after the date of arrest and service of the notice the person's license along 
with a copy of the citation issued regarding the offense, and a signed report 
indicating the chemical test results, if any, and any other basis for the officer's 
138 
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(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition render-
ing him incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is consid-
ered to not have withdrawn the consent provided for in subsection (1), and the 
test or tests may be administered whether the person has been arrested or not 
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or 
tests shall be made available to him 
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or person autho-
rized under Subsection 26-1-30 (19), acting at the request of a peace offi-
cer, may withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content This 
limitation does not apply to the taking of a urine or breath specimen 
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person autho-
rized under Subsection 26-1-30 (19) who, at the direction of a peace offi-
cer, draws a sample of blood from any person whom a peace officer has 
reason to believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or 
medical facility at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil 
or criminal liability arising from drawing the sample, if the test is admin-
istered according to standard medical practice. 
(6) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician 
of his own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests 
administered at the direction of a peace officer The failure or inability to 
obtain the additional test does not affect admissabihty of the results of 
the test or tests taken at the direction of a peace officer, or preclude or 
delay the test or tests to be taken at the direction of a peace officer The 
additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests administered at the 
direction of a peace officer. 
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or 
tests, the person to be tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or 
have an attorney, physician, or other person present as a condition for the 
taking of any test 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or 
any additional test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in 
any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have 
been committed while the person was operating or in actual physical control 
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combi-
nation of alcohol and any drug 
Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug 
— Number of tests — Refusal — Warning, report 
— Hearing, revocation of license — Appeal — 
Person incapable of refusal — Results of test 
available — Who may give test —L Evidence [Ef-
fective January 1, 1988 J. 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to 
have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or 
urine for the purpose of determining whether he was operating or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under 
I 41-6*44, if the test is or tests are administered at the direction of a 
217 
41-6-44.10 MOTOR VEHICLES 
peace officer having grounds to believe that person to have been operat-
ing or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or 
breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influ-
ence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under 
5 41-6-44. 
(b) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered 
and how many of them, shall be administered. If an officer requests more 
than one test, refusal by a person to take one or more requested tests, 
even though he does submit to any other requested test or tests, is a 
refusal under this section. 
(c) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to a 
chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, may not select the test 
or tests to be administered. The failure or inability of a peace officer to 
arrange for any specific test is not a defense to taking a test requested by 
a peace officer, and it is not a defense in any criminal, civil, or adminis-
trative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the re-
quested test or tests. 
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, and has then been re-
quested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical 
tests under Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to the chemical test or 
any one or all of the tests requested, the person shall be warned by a 
peace officer requesting the test or tests that a refusal to submit to the 
test or tests may result in revocation of his license to operate a motor 
vehicle. Following this warning, unless the person immediately requests 
that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be adminis-
tered, no test may be given A peace officer shall serve on the person, on 
behalf of the division, immediate notice of the division's intention to re-
voke the person's privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle. If the 
officer serves the immediate notice on behalf of the division he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the opera-
tor, 
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 30 days; and 
(in) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the division, 
basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the divi-
sion A citation issued by a peace officer may, if approved as to form 
by the division, serve also as the temporary license. The peace officer 
shall submit a signed report, within five days after the date of the 
arrest, that he had grounds to believe the arrested person had been 
operating or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while 
having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited or 
while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of 
alcohol and any drug under & 41-6-44 and that the person had re-
fused to submit to a chemical test or tests under Subsection (I), 
(b) Within 20 days after receiving a written request, the division shall 
notify the person of his opportunity to be heard as early as practicable, 
and that his request shall be made within ten days after the date of 
arrest. If the person does not make a timely written request for a hearing 
before the division, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Utah shall 
be revoked for a period of one year beginning on the 31st day after the 
date of arrest If a hearing is requested by the person and conducted by 
the division, and the division determines that the person was granted the 
218 
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right to submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test 
or tests, or if the person fails to appear before the division as required in 
the notice, the division shall revoke his license or permit to operate a 
motor vehicle in Utah for one year, beginning on the date the hearing is 
held The division shall also assess against the person, in addition to any 
fee imposed under Subsection 41-2-112 (6), a fee under § 41-2-103, which 
shall be paid before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover 
administrative costs The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an 
unappealed court decision following a proceeding allowed under this sub-
section that the revocation was improper 
(c) An> person whose license has been revoked by the division under 
this section ma> seek judicial review in the circuit court in the county in 
which the person resides 
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition render-
ing him incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is consid-
ered to not have withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the 
test or tests ma> be administered whether the person has been arrested or not 
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or 
tests shall be made available to him 
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person autho-
rized under Subsection 26 1-30 (19), acting at the request of a peace offi-
cer, may withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content This 
limitation does not apply to the taking of a urine or breath specimen 
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person autho-
rized under Subsection 26-1-30 (19) who, at the direction of a peace offi-
cer, draws a sample of blood from any person whom a peace officer has 
reason to believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or 
medical facility at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil 
or criminal liabilit) arising from drawing the sample, if the test is admin-
istered according to standard medical practice 
(6) (a) The person to be tested ma>, at his own expense, have a ph>sician 
of his own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or 
tests administered at the direction of a peace officer 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect 
admissibility of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a 
peace officer, or preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the 
direction of a peace officer 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests adminis-
tered at the direction of a peace officer 
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or 
tests, the person to be tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or 
have an attorney, ph>sician, or other person present as a condition for the 
taking of any test 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or 
any additional test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in 
any civil or cnminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have 
been committed while the person was operating or in actual physical control 
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combi-
nation of alcohol and any drug 
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